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INSURERS' LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA:
SHIFTING HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE
CLEANUP COSTS TO THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
Insurance companies and the United States government have
reached an impasse regarding coverage for hazardous waste generators,
transporters, and disposers.1 The strict liability standard of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA)2 holds hazardous waste generators,3 transporters,4 and
disposers5 liable for damages6 resulting from materials left in aban-
I. See generally, Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearings on S. 321-24 Before the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) [here-
inafter Senate Hearings] (detailed discussion of government and insurers' views of haz-
ardous waste insurance problems and proposed solutions).
One insurance industry spokesman predicts that insurers will stop issuing insurance
policies for hazardous waste generators, haulers, or disposers under the existing liability
scheme. Id. at 37 (comments of Wheeler Hess, Senior Vice President of the Travelers
Insurance Company).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). CERCLA is also commonly referred to as
"Superfund." CERCLA's liability standard is found at § 9607. See infra note 22 and
accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's use of strict liability.
3. A generator is generally defined as a company or person that produces hazardous
waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). This section states that persons who arrange by
contract, agreement, or otherwise for disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances by others can be liable for response costs and natural
resource damages from an abandoned waste site at which the hazardous wastes were
deposited. Id. § 9607(a)(3). This provision does not cover generators disposing of
wastes on-site. But see infra note 5 (some on-site generators would qualify for liability
under § 9607(a)(1) and (2)).
4. A transporter is defined as a party that "accepts or accepted hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such per-
son. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
5. Disposers are defined as owners or operators of facilities at the time the hazard-
ous waste is discarded, or the current owners and operators of a facility when the CER-
CLA suit is brought. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2).
CERCLA broadly defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
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doned waste sites.7 CERCLA burdens insurers of hazardous waste
generators, transporters, and disposers because the insurers have a
duty to defend and indemnify these high risk policyholders.8 Insurers,
therefore, are threatening to stop insuring hazardous waste generators,
transporters, and disposers until Congress imposes a cap on damage
awards under CERCLA.9 Insurers argue that such a cap is necessary
because current technology cannot prevent leaks of stored hazardous
wastes.10 Court decisions holding insurers liable under expired poli-
cies,11 including policies containing pollution exclusion clauses,12 fur-
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or
aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any
consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
6. Damages include removal and response costs incurred by the government or
other individuals when cleaning up the abandoned site, and the compensation for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the expenses and costs of as-
sessing the injury, destruction or loss resulting from the release. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-
(C).
7. See Jernberg, Insurance For Environmental and Toxic Risks: A Basic Analysis of
the Gap Between Liability and Coverage, 34 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 123, 126-27
(1984). The most common CERCLA violation is hazardous wastes leaking from the
disposal site and contaminating the area ground water. Id. at 137.
8. See generally R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 7.1 (1971).
9. See generally Senate Hearings, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 34-35. (testimony of T. Lawrence Jones, President of the American In-
surance Association). Private insurers may refuse to cover site operations because of
the "near certainty" that leakage will occur. See Parizeh, The Time Perspective in the
Subsurface Management of Waste, in HAZARDOUS AND Toxic WASTES: TECHNOL-
OGY, MANAGEMENT AND HEALTH EFFECTS 137-69 (Majumdar & Miller eds. 1984)
(discussion of how the ground water flow system transports disposed waters to pollute
surface and subsurface waters); Schmalz, Geological Factors in Disposal Site Selection,
in HAZARDOUS AND ToxIc WASTES: TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND HEALTH
EFFECTS, supra, at 187 (discussing the difficulties in finding adequate burial sites that
will isolate hazardous wastes from the environment, and describing burial site require-
ments).
In 1980 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that 14,000 to 90,000
land-disposal sites were leaking pollutants, contaminating surface waters and ground
waters. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 303
(1982). One author also questions if any landfill can be truly secured from leaking
pollutants on a long-term basis. Id. at 336.
11. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for an example of a pollution ex-
clusion clause.
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ther exacerbate the problem.1 3
The insurance dispute raises many critical policy considerations, in-
cluding the proper scope of industry liability for hazardous waste
cleanup;14 the insurability of hazardous waste generators, haulers, and
disposers;15 the scope of insurers' liability for hazardous waste damage
incurred by a present or former policyholder; 6 and Congress' possible
ban on production of chemicals whose manufacture creates hazardous
byproducts. 7
This Recent Development studies the problems arising between in-
surer and policyholder in CERCLA litigation, and suggests appropri-
ate responses to the public policy considerations. Part I discusses
CERCLA's liability standard for the hazardous waste insurance indus-
try. Part II traces the development of insurance policies covering haz-
ardous wastes. Part III examines recent CERCLA litigation and
analyzes judicial interpretations of insurance policies. This Recent De-
13. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 33 (testimony of T. Lawrence Jones, President
of the American Insurance Association). Insurers disapprove of court-imposed cover-
age when the policy terms clearly indicate that insurers did not intend coverage in these
situations. Id. at 33.
14. See generally F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 1-30 (1984). One problem with the free
market system is that environmental resources remain outside the market and, there-
fore, are still unpriced. Valuable environmental assets such as rivers, air, landscape
features and "even silence are 'used up,' but their use is not accurately reflected in the
price system." These externalities burden society at large, not just the user who actually
consumes them. F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 3-4, 22-26
(1977).
Because waste-assimilating capacities of air and water as public resources do not
command a price, the private market system encourages their overuse instead of their
conservation. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY
5-6 (1975). Private producers use these resources instead of expensive mechanisms to
reduce generated residues. Id. Some authorities advocate shifting the costs of these
externalities to the manufacturer that uses the resource for waste disposal. In this way
the market price of the product bears its true cost to society. F. ANDERSON, A.
KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, supra.
15. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. See S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, supra note 10, at 368-69 (use of a limited
governmental ban of specific highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals to reduce disposal
problems). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 28 (testimony of Thomas C.
Jorling, Professor of Insurance Studies and Director of the Center for Environmental
Studies, Williams College). The marketplace makes the judgment that an activity is so
inherently risky that it is uninsurable and it should not be pursued. Id.
1987]
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velopment concludes that insurers have a broad duty to defend or in-
demnify an insured generator, transporter, or disposer.
I. CERCLA's LIABILITY STANDARD
CERCLA requires hazardous waste generators or disposers to carry
liability insurance.18 Congress intended to achieve cleanup of aban-
doned hazardous waste sites by allowing the government to recover
"response costs"19 incurred in cleaning up abandoned sites.2" Most
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9615 (1982). CERCLA requires the owner or operator of
any "vessel" over 300 gross tons that transports hazardous wastes to establish financial
responsibility for the greater of $300 per gross ton or $5,000,000. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9608(a)(1). This financial responsibility can be established by any combination of in-
surance, guarantee, surety bond, or qualification as self-insurer. Id. The President is
required to set financial responsibility requirements for waste disposal facilities "consis-
tent with the degree and duration of risk associated with the production, transportation,
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1). This
financial responsibility requirement does not mandate insurance coverage.
CERCLA's passage concurrent with the passage of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982), may be one reason why an
insurance requirement provision is absent. RCRA regulates the disposal of hazardous
wastes by seeking safe disposal through implementation of a manifest system of con-
trols. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 35 (1982).
CERCLA regulates cleanups stemming from leakage at waste sites. Id. at 36. CER-
CLA's Post-Closure Tax and Liability Trust Fund also provides funds that the Presi-
dent can use to compensate claims resulting from a closed facility's hazardous waste
releases. Id. at 35-36.
RCRA requires insurance coverage for owners and operators of hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.147 (1986). The owners
and operators "must have and maintain liability coverage for sudden accidental occur-
rences in the amount of at least $1 million per occurrence with an annual aggregate of at
least $2 million, inclusive of legal defense costs." Id. § 264.147(a). A party may fulfill
this requirement by passing a financial test for self-insured liability coverage. Id.
§ 264.147(f).
19. Response costs are the costs of actions under authority of the President to rem-
edy or minimize a release or threatened release of hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24), (25). The President can also delegate
his authority to the state or political subdivision thereof. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(l).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119 (legislative
history of CERCLA).
CERCLA also permits the government to recover for damages to natural resources.
CERCLA defines natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground
water, drinking water supplies, and other resources belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States ... any State or
local government, or any foreign government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). See generally
Menefee, Recovery for Natural Resource Damages Under Superfund: The Rule of the
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courts hold that waste site contributors2" are strictly liable for response
costs and other environmental damage caused by hazardous waste
releases.22
CERCLA insurance litigation usually involves insurer liability under
expired policies. 23 Most courts hold that insurers have a duty to de-
Rebuttable Presumption, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,057-64 (1982) (describes
government suits to recover compensation for natural resource injuries).
CERCLA does not allow recovery for third parties who are victims of hazardous
waste exposure. Several articles discuss ways in which third parties can recover com-
pensation for injuries sustained from hazardous waste releases. See, e.g., Note, Long-
Term Liability for Hazardous Waste Induced Injury: Latent Harm Sufferers Beware, 28
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 299, 319-43 (1985) (reviews common tort law ap-
proaches victims can use to obtain compensation and advocates adoption of a state
statutory cause of action for hazardous waste pollution induced personal injuries); Note,
The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of
Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 614-15 (1983) (sug-
gests using an environmental risk approach to compensate toxic waste victims-allowing
victims to recover from a government fund administered similar to CERCLA's
Superfund); Note, Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Aris-
ing from the Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 33 S.C.L. REv.
543, 573-75 (1982) (advocates national legislation that would provide hazardous waste
victims with statutory causes of action against polluters); Comment, In Search of Ade-
quate Compensation for Toxic Waste Injuries, Who and How to Sue, 12 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 609 (1985) (discusses traditional tort theory application to toxic waste injury
claims).
21. "Contributors" refers to generators, transporters, or disposal facility owners
and operators who had contact with chemicals deposited in an authorized or unauthor-
ized hazardous waste site.
22. See generally F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 14,
at 573-78 (discussion of CERCLA liability standard); Price, Dividing the Costs of Haz-
ardous Waste Site Clean Ups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several Liability Appropri-
ate?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 339, 362-63 (1984) (courts should not apply strict joint and
several liability under CERCLA); compare Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 52
UMKC L. REv. 364-82 (1984) (early CERCLA cases support using strict joint and
several liability concepts in hazardous waste litigation); Hinds, Liability Under Federal
Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1982) (CERCLA
seems to require joint and several liability but case law suggests courts will generally
apportion damages).
Some jurisdictions apply CERCLA retroactively. See generally Blaymore, Retroac-
tive Application of Superfund: Con Old Dogs be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1-50 (1985) (advocates retroactive application of CERCLA to past con-
duct that results in present hazardous releases). Insurers oppose retroactive liability
under CERCLA because it burdens the insurance companies to the extent that they
cannot service other markets. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 34. (testimony of T.
Lawrence Jones, President of the American Insurance Association).
23. E.g., CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d
1265 (Law Div. 1984) (policyholder sued to compel insurer to defend him in 1982 CER-
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fend the policyholder, and in some cases indemnify that policyholder,
if the particular policy was in effect at the time of the alleged injury.24
Section 112(c)(3) of CERCLA allows the government to sue insurers
and other guarantors of a liable party directly to recover government
expenditures paid out of CERCLA's Superfund.25 No reported cases
exist involving suits brought by the government against insurers. In-
stead, the government has sued former policyholders, who in turn de-
mand that the insurer defend the suit.26
The government contends that strict joint and several liability pro-
motes just and efficient cleanups.2 Insurers criticize this scheme be-
cause it imposes liability on "innocent parties" such as generators who
were unaware of their haulers' illegal dumping activities.28 Insurers
also claim that joint and several liability leads to inequitable results,
such as holding a generator liable for the entire response cost after it
contributed only slightly to a hazardous waste leak. 9 Additionally,
CLA liability action under an insurance policy that was effective between March 2,
1974 and March 2, 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886
(App. Div. 1985).
24. Id. at 1271.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3). In these recovery actions, CERCLA limits the guaran-
tor's defenses to those available to the owner or operator, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), and to
the defense that the owner or operator's actions amounted to willful misconduct. 42
U.S.C. § 9608(c).
CERCLA limits the guarantor's liability to the monetary limits of the insurance pol-
icy or indemnity contract when the guarantor is acting in good faith. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9609(d). See generally Kunzman, The Insurer As Surrogate Regulator of the Hazard-
ous Waste Industry: Solution or Perversion?, 20 FORUM 469, 473 (1985) (discussion of
insurer's responsibilities under CERCLA).
26. Eg., CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A,2d
1265 (Law Div. 1984), rev'd, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985). See
also Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127,
477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984) (insurer filed for declaratory judgment seeking determination
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify policyholder in CERCLA liability suit filed
against policyholder).
27. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 8 (testimony of Gene A. Lucero, Director of
the Office of Waste Program Enforcement, EPA). Lucero said that removing strict
joint and several liability "would require the government to establish what each party's
relationship was to the site and its liability for it." Id. This process would be too slow
and cumbersome, considering that some CERCLA cases could have over 300 individual
parties involved. In addition, this process would discourage group settlements. Id.
28. Id. (testimony of T. Lawrence Jones, President of the American Insurance As-
sociation (AIA), reading statement of William 0. Bailey, President of Aetna Life &
Casualty and immediate past President of AIA).
29. Id. at 8. See also McLaughlin, Superfund Suits and Tactics, 24 FOR THE DEF. 2
(Apr. 1982) (current owner who had no control over prior disposal practices and who
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insurers argue that the government's liability scheme unduly encour-
ages courts to "misinterpret" expired policies to impose a duty on in-
surers to defend and indemnify under the old polices.30 Imposing this
duty extends insurers' potential liability far beyond that contemplated
at the time the policy was issued.3 '
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE POLICIES COVERING
HAZARDOUS WASTE
Until the 1960s, pollution claims were insured under Comprehensive
General Liability (CGL) policies.3 2 Companies involved in hazardous
waste disposal purchased CGL policies to protect themselves against
"fortuitous" losses.3 3 These policies typically limited coverage to
losses resulting from a sudden and accidental pollution discharge.34
Large companies purchased additional "occurrence" 35 coverage,
36
which provided protection against gradual releases in addition to sud-
den releases.3 7 In 1966 the insurance industry reacted to the develop-
may not have owned the land when the hazardous material was dumped can be held
liable under CERCLA). Id.
30. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 33 (testimony ofT. Lawrence Jones, President
of AIA, reading statement of William 0. Bailey, President of Aetna Life & Casualty
and immediate past President of AIA). Mr. Bailey's statement criticized recent court
decisions that extended insurance policy coverage to gradual leaks of hazardous waste
when the policy's pollution exclusion clause allowed only coverage for "sudden and
accidental" leaks. Id.
31. Id.
32. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM
551, 552 (1980). The CGL policy is the instrument most often purchased to provide
liability protection for commercial ventures. See Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion
Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General
Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 497, 498 (1981).
33. Hourihan, supra note 32, at 552. Losses in pollution claims are usually due to
property damage and bodily injury caused by pollutants. Id.
34. Id. CGL policies covered only damages and injuries resulting from sudden and
accidental discharges of pollutants. A typical definition of "accident" used during the
1960s was "a distinctive event that takes place by some unexpected happening, at a date
which can be fixed with reasonable certainty." 11 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW § 44:288 (R. Anderson rev. 2d ed. 1982).
35. "Occurrence" was defined in modified liability insurance forms as "an accident,
including continuances or repeated exposure to conditions which result in bodily injury
or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
R. KEETON, supra note 8, § 35.10(d).
36. Hourihan, supra note 32, at 552-53.
37. Id. The basic promise contained in most policies was:
Mo pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
266 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:259
ment of "occurrence" coverage by making "occurrence" the
benchmark for all CGL policies. 8 Insurer liability under an "occur-
rence" standard includes losses from gradual releases because liability
is triggered if the accident is unforeseeable39 and the policyholder did
not intend the release.'
A deluge of pollution claims following the Torrey Canyon disaster
and the Santa Barbara off-shore oil spill led the insurance industry to
modify its pollution coverage.41 Insurers began writing pollution ex-
clusion clauses42 into CGL policies.4 3 The insurance industry con-
tended that pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies expressly
exclude liability for losses caused by gradual pollutant releases. 44 In-
surers supported this position through the development of Environ-
mental Impairment Liability Insurance (EIL), which specifically
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which
this insurance applies caused by an occurrence, and arising out of any other opera-
tion, activities, or use of property, real or personal, except an occurrence incident
to a non-business pursuit.
Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 32, at 498. See generally Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance
in Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM 762, 763 (1976) (discussion of what constitutes
an occurrence that triggers insurer's duties under a CGL policy).
38. Hourihan, supra note 32, at 553. See also Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 32, at 499;
R. KEETON, supra note 8, § 2.11(c) (discussing the 1966 revision made by automobile
liability insurance firms).
39. Note, Insurance and Its Role in the Struggle Between Protecting Pollution Vic-
tims and the Producers of Pollution, 31 DRAKE L. RnV. 913, 915 (1982) (arguing that
policyholder would be denied coverage if a reasonable person expected that his actions
would violate an environmental responsibility).
40. Id. at 915.
41. The Torrey Canyon was an oil tanker that went aground along the coast of
England in 1967. The Santa Barbara oil spill occurred in 1969, when an oil platform
exploded off California's coastline. Id See Hourihan, supra note 32, at 553; Kunzman,
supra note 25, at 475.
42. A typical pollution exclusion clause states:
This insurance does not apply: ... (f) to bodily injury or property damage aris-
ing out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants, or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course
or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Bucheye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 132,
477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984) (emphasis added).
43. Hourihan, supra note 32, at 553.
44. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 33 (testimony ofT. Lawrence Jones, President
of AIA, reading statement of William 0. Bailey, President of Aetna Life & Casualty
and immediate past President of AIA).
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protects against losses due to gradual pollutant releases.45
EIL policies compensate policyholders for damage resulting from
unintentional, unexpected releases of hazardous wastes that occur dur-
ing the policy term.46 Coverage for a particular incident is determined
on a "claims made" basis,47 and payment is limited to pollution claims
filed during the policy term.48 In most cases, the occurrence provision
in a CGL policy provides broader coverage than an EIL policy.49 The
courts hold that CGL occurrence provisions merely require the com-
plaint to allege that the damaging event occurred during the policy
term.5° In most jurisdictions, liability under a standard CGL policy
does not depend on when the insured discovers the injury or whether
45. Insurers developed EIL policies to cover the gap in CGL coverage due to the
use of pollution exclusion clauses. The EIL policy includes a broad definition of envi-
ronmental impairment that triggers coverage for:
(a) The emission, discharge, dispersal, disposal, seepage, release or escape of any
liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or pollutant into or upon
land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; (b) the generation of
smell, noises, ... changes in temperature or any other sensory phenomena; aris-
ing out of or in the course of the insured's operations, installations or premises, all
as designated in the Declarations.
Note, supra note 39, at 923 (emphasis added).
46. The EIL usually contains an exclusion clause stating that insurers do not have
to cover policyholders when any responsible person of the insured "was aware of non-
compliance" with any rule or regulation relating to environmental impairment. Id. at
923-24.
47. Rosbe, Transport of Hazardous Substances, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,255, 10,254 (insurers will pay claim under an EIL policy only if it is made while the
insurance is in force). The claim can be a single claim or a series of claims from one or
multiple claimants. Note, supra note 39, at 923.
48. EIL policies provide coverage for claims of "environmental impairment" as op-
posed to claims of "accident" or "occurance." Id.
49. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md.
1985). The court in Mraz held that the insurer had a duty to defend the policyholder in
a CERCLA liability suit. 1d. at 1182. The complaint alleged that damage occurred to
the ground and water when leaking drums were first placed into the hazardous waste
disposal site. Id. at 1176. The policyholder buried the drums in 1969, while the in-
surer's policy was in effect. The damage was not discovered until late 1981. Id. The
United States filed a CERCLA lawsuit in 1983 against the generator-policyholder.
Compare Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., No. 84-
5034-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The court
in Continental Insurance held that the insurer did not have a duty to defend or indem-
nify the policyholder. The court stated that the government, in prior CERCLA law-
suits, did not allege that damages were incurred during the time of the policy's effective
dates. In addition, the government did not seek compensation for bodily injury or prop-
erty damage, but only for site cleanup costs that accrued almost seven years after the
1987]
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the insured files the resulting claim after the policy period ends.51
Policyholders rarely file claims in CERCLA litigation for defense or
indemnification under EIL policies. A long time period usually elapses
between the release of hazardous waste and the discovery of the result-
ing damage.52 The EIL policy usually expires before the policyholder
discovers the injury and files the claim.53 In addition, policyholders
fear that insurers will terminate their policies. Policy cancellation
could force the policyholder out of business because the Resource Con-
servation Recovery Act (RCRA)54 requires EIL coverage.5 5 As a re-
sult, most policyholders defend CERCLA claims under their CGL
policies. 56
III. RECENT CERCLA LITIGATION
CGL policies obligate insurers to defend and/or indemnify the poli-
cyholder in any suit alleging bodily injury or property damage that
falls within the scope of the insurance agreement. 7 The standard
CGL policy, requiring insurers to defend a claim even if the suit is
groundless, false, or fraudulent,58 shows that the duty to defend can be
triggered even if it is unlikely the court will find a duty to indemnify.59
policies terminated. See infra note 89 (discussion of what triggers the insurer's duty to
indemnify).
51. See supra note 50.
52. See Rosbe, supra note 47, at 10,254. See also supra notes 45-48 and accompany-
ing text.
53. See Rosbe, supra note 47, at 10,254.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1983).
55. Id. § 6924. This section refers to financial requirements for hazardous waste
site owners and operators.
56. See Rosbe, supra note 47, at 10,254.
57. See supra note 37 (scope of typical CGL policy's granting powers).
58. In Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), the'court found that the insurer had a duty to defend the
waste generator in a CERCLA liability suit. The complaint clearly alleged an occur-
rence that fell within the coverage of the insurance policy. Id. at 131-32, 477 N.E.2d at
1233. The court noted that CERCLA can impose strict liability on a generator regard-
less of its relative degree of fault or responsibility in creating the hazardous condition.
Id. at 130, 477 N.E.2d at 1232.
59. Id. at 129, 477 N.E.2d at 1230. The generator would probably not be held liable
for damages because the company he contracted with to receive the waste was careless
in its treatment of the hazardous wastes on the property. Id. at 128, 477 N.E.2d at
1229. The disposal company stored drums and other containers on its site for long
periods, exposed to the weather. Many of the barrels leaked because of corrosion and
careless handling. Id. at 129, 477 N.E.2d at 1231. See Jackson Township Mun. Utils.
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Most courts limit inquiry concerning the duty to defend to the alle-
gations filed in the complaint against the policyholder.6° Courts hold
insurers responsible for defending policyholders when the allegations
underlying the complaint fall within the risks the policy covers.61 In
Mraz v. American Universal Insurance Co.62 the court expanded this
standard. The court found a duty to defend when the alleged claim
against the policyholder was "potentially within" the policy's cover-
Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (Law
Div. 1982). The Jackson court held that an insurer had a duty to defend an insured
municipal utilities authority, which owned and operated a landfill, in a tort suit. The
suit alleged that the Authority negligently selected and operated a landfill that resulted
in seepage of pollutants into neighboring residents' ground water. Id. at 159, 451 A.2d
at 99 1. The court held that an insurer's duty to defend is not excused because a claim
cannot be maintained against the insured either in law or in fact. Id. at 160, 451 A.2d at
992. "The question of which carrier must indemnify for the occurrence or occurrences
of pollution is a separate and perplexing question ... [that] should await the outcome
of the main [liability] suit." Id. at 165-66, 451 A.2d at 995.
60. See, eg., Buckeye, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 129, 477 N.E.2d at 1230 (court must
determine whether the complaint's allegations state a claim that is or may be within the
policy's coverage); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 563-64,
489 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Law Div. 1984) (court must determine whether the complaint's
allegations fall within the risks covered by the CGL policy).
Compare Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985). In Riehl the insured
owner of a toxic waste dump site sought a declaration that certain insurance policies
covered the expense of cleaning up his property. Id. at 20. The EPA notified the in-
sured owner that it would commence cleanup and assess response costs against insured,
but failed to file legal proceedings against the insured before the declaratory action. Id.
at 21. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether
an "occurrence" had taken place and whether the owner knew of illegal dumping on his
property. The court had to decide these issues before it could determine if the policies
covered the cleanup costs. Id. at 23-24. Buckeye, CPS, and Riehl all show that the
drafter of a CERCLA liability complaint can control whether a defendant policy-
holder's insurance company will be brought into a lawsuit.
61. See Buckeye, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 131, 477 N.E.2d at 1232. The Buckeye court
held that a CERCLA liability suit against the generator raised a claim that fell within
an insurance policy because the generator can be held strictly liable under CERCLA for
any damages resulting from his toxic wastes. In CPS the court held that the insurer had
a duty to defend a generator-policyholder in a government liability suit. The complaint
alleged that the generator was liable even if it turned the wastes over to a third party for
disposal. 199 N.J. Super. at 564-65, 489 A.2d at 1268-69.
Compare Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30
(1st Cir. 1984). The court held that a CGL policy did not provide coverage for pollu-
tion that the government alleged resulted from the manufacturer's irregular business
activity because the resultant damage fell within language of one of the policy's exclu-
sions. Id. at 32-33.
62. 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md. 1985).
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age.63 The court added that allegations "clearly outside the scope of
coverage" do not trigger the insurer's defense obligation.
64
Courts must analyze the allegations raised in a complaint to deter-
mine if they trigger the duty to defend. 65 In Mraz the court first ex-
amined the allegations in the complaint, 66 and then studied the CGL
policy to determine if the claim raised was "potentially within" the
policy coverage. 67 The court focused its inquiry on whether the dam-
age resulting from the policyholder's actions was either foreseeable or
intentional.68 The court found that although the policyholder intended
to dispose of the hazardous material at the waste site, it did not intend
or expect subsequent leakage.69 Consequently, the release was an "oc-
currence" within the meaning of the CGL.7°
After a court determines that a particular release is an "occurrence,"
it must decide if the resulting damage is within the policy's pollution
exclusion provision.7" Pollution exclusion clauses commonly preclude
63. Id. at 1177.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 1175. The insured faced liability for cleanup of an alleged hazardous
waste dump site in Maryland under CERCLA and state law. Id. The allegations in the
complaint were:
(1) that hazardous substances had in the past been released and threatened to con-
tinue to be released from the [hazardous waste landfill] into the air, water, and soil,
before the site was cleaned up, (2) that those releases resulted in strong odors in the
air and discolored run-off in a nearby creek, (3) that they imposed a possible health
threat to residents, and (4) that [Mraz] was at least partially responsible.
Id. at 1177.
67. Id. The 1969 policy provided for general liability insurance coverage, including
"personal injury or property damage by an 'occurance' within the policy period." Id.
The policy defined "occurrence" as " 'an accident, including injurious exposure to con-
dition, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.' Property damage
was defined as 'injury to or destruction of tangible property.'" Id.
68. Id. at 1178. The court adopted the Buckeye court's interpretation of "unex-
pected or unintended" as referring to the leakage, not to the actual dumping. Id. But
see American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich.
1984). The American States court held that the release of toxic chemicals from a dump
site was not an "occurrence" within the insured's policy because the waste dumping was
part of the insured's usual business. Id. at 1152-53.
69. 616 F. Supp. at 1178.
70. Id. at 1178-79. The court found the resulting leakage unintended and unex-
pected because the waste was legally disposed of in a clap pit. The pit was expected to
form a natural barrier against leakage. Id. at 1170.
71. The court in Mraz held that the leakage of hazardous wastes, causing contami-
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coverage for property damage and bodily injury resulting from dispo-
sal, dispersion, or release of hazardous wastes unless the release was
sudden and accidental.7 2 Courts in CERCLA cases generally hold that
gradual releases are within the sudden and accidental exception.73
In CPS Chemical Co. v. Continental Insurance Co.74 the court explic-
itly rejected an insurer's definition of "sudden and accidental" that re-
quired a dramatic catastrophe "limited in duration and immediate in
its consequences."" The court adopted a definition of "sudden" that
required a "happening without previous notice or on very brief notice;
unforeseen; unexpected; unprepared for.",7 6 When interpreting "sud-
den and accidental" provisions, courts generally distinguish between
nation of soil and water, was property damage within the policy's coverage. Id. at 1179.
See also Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 549 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Or.
1982) (water contamination from an oil slick released from sunken dredging vessel held
to be property damage for insurance policy purposes). Compare Continental Ins. Co. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., No. 84-5034-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. June 25,
1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (court held that the filing of the CERCLA suit
constituted property damage suffered by the insured for insurance policy purposes, not
the alleged property damage resulting from a release of hazardous wastes).
72. 616 F. Supp. at 1178. See also Buckeye, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 130, 477 N.E.2d at
1232 (generator-policyholder's potential liability under CERCLA establishes insurer's
duty to defend absent clear and unambiguous exclusion of coverage). See supra note 42
and accompanying text for a common pollution exclusion clause used in CGL policies.
73. This broad interpretation probably developed because some courts found the
terms "sudden and accidental" ambiguous. The court in Lansco, Inc. v. Department of
Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 145 N.J.
Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), cert denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322
(1977), found that an occurrence, which resulted from vandals' release of hazardous
substances from the insured's storage tank, was sudden and accidental because the event
was unexpected. Id. at 278, 350 A.2d at 523.
Other courts broadened the insured's coverage by holding an occurrence to be sudden
and accidental when the result or injury was unexpected or unintended. In Buckeye, 17
Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), the court concluded that the definition of
sudden and accidental was a restatement of the definition of occurrence. The court held
that the policy would cover claims when the injury was "neither expected nor in-
tended." Id. at 133, 477 N.E.2d at 1234. The court then determined that the CGL
policy covered claims arising from a gradual release of hazardous wastes leaking from a
landfill. Id. at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235. Accord Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 162-64, 451 A.2d 990, 993-94
(Law Div. 1982) (court held city's CGL policy covered a suit alleging that the city
negligently polluted and contaminated ground water with gradual hazardous waste
leakage from the municipal landfill).
74. 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (Law Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985).
75. Id. at 569, 489 A.2d at 1270-71.
76. Id., 489 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Lansco, 138 N.J. Super. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524).
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policyholders who intend a release by conscious, illegal dumping activi-
ties77 and those whose hazardous waste release into the environment is
unintentional.7 8
Insurers include other policy exclusions such as "completed opera-
tions hazard"79 and "products hazard"80 to restrict liability for pollu-
tion claims."1 Cases determining an insurer's duty to defend CERCLA
77. See Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30,
33 (lst Cir. 1984) (court held that hazardous waste release was not "sudden and acci-
dental" because the generator-policyholder emptied chemical storage barrels on its
property as a regular business activity).
In American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich.
1984), the court held that insurers did not have a duty to defend or indemnify policy-
holders in a tort suit. Id. at 1553. The court found that the tort complaint alleged that
the general policyholder intentionally and continuously dumped hazardous wastes, con-
taminating neighboring water supplies. Id. at 1551. Thus, the court concluded that the
waste generator did not state a claim within the policy coverage. Id. at 1553-54. Accord
Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985) (court held a CGL policy ex-
cluded coverage of property owners who had knowledge of the toxic waste dumping).
78. See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 134, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1235 (1984) (court held the illegal disposal of hazardous
wastes was sudden and accidental from the standpoint of the insured generator because
the CERCLA suit did not allege that the generators knew of or expected the illegal
dumping). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1980). The court held that the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify an
insured landowner in a tort suit. Id. at 489, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605. The complaint al-
leged that the landowner negligently installed and maintained gasoline storage tanks
that leaked gasoline and damaged neighboring property. Id. at 487, 426 N.Y.S.2d at
604. The court found the negligence allegation within the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion clause: "If there was no intent to cause harm then
any injury resulting from ordinary negligence is considered to be accidental." Id. at
488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
79. An insurance policy's "completed operations hazard" clause usually provides:
'completed operation hazard' includes bodily injury and property damage arising
out of operations or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at any time
with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property damage occurs after
such operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away from prem-
ises owned by or rented to the named insured. 'Operations' include materials, parts
or equipment furnished in connection therewith.
Buckeye, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 134-35, 477 N.E.2d at 1236.
80. A typical insurance policy's "products hazard" exclusion provides:
'products hazard' includes bodily injury and property damage arising out of the
named insured's products or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at
any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property damage
occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named insured and after
physical possession of such products has been relinquished to others.
Id. at 135, 477 N.E.2d at 1236.
81. See generally Hourihan, supra note 32, at 562-63 (discussing products hazard
and completed operations coverage).
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claims hold that these clauses do not preclude liability. Courts inter-
pret the "completed operations hazard" provision to exclude coverage
for accidents caused by defective workmanship that occur after the pol-
icyholder completes the required construction or service contract
work. 2 Courts, however, have failed to apply this exclusion to cases
involving transporters' or disposers' activities.8 In CERCLA litiga-
tion courts limit application of the "products hazard" exclusion by
narrowly defining "products." 4 The court's reasoning in CPS Chemi-
cal is typical.8 5 The court in that case held that industrial waste is not
a "product" because it is "not intended for consumption, sale, or use
by others."816
After the court determines that an "occurrence" is not within a pol-
lution exclusion clause, it must decide if the occurrence is within the
policy period. If so, the insurer has a duty to defend.87 Courts that
limit their inquiry to the allegations in the complaint require that the
allegations specify that damage was sustained during the policy pe-
riod.88 Litigants may experience difficulty determining when the par-
ticular damage occurred, however, if the injury was not discovered
until long after the initial exposure to toxic waste.89
82. See id. The Buckeye court held that this exclusion does not apply to an insured
generator when the allegations in a CERCLA liability suit do not involve construction
or service operations of the generator. Id. The court reached this conclusion even
though the CERCLA suit involved the contracted disposal company's illegal dumping
of the generator's hazardous wastes. Id. at 135-36, 477 N.E.2d at 1237. See also CPS
Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super, 558, 567, 489 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Law
Div. 1984) (court held that because the insured generator hired a disposal company to
remove hazardous waste, the removal did not involve construction or service operations
of generator).
83. Insurers usually assert that the "completed operations hazard" provision ex-
cludes coverage for transporters' and disposers' activities because they are performing a
"service." CPS, 199 N.J. Super. at 567, 489 A.2d at 1270.
84. See, e.g., id at 568, 489 A.2d at 1270. Most courts define "products" as "goods
and services that the insured deals in as his stock-in-trade." Id. Compare Buckeye, 17
Ohio App. 3d at 135, 477 N.E.2d at 1236 ("there must be a defective condition in the
product itself which proximately causes the damage before the product hazard exclu-
sion will preclude coverage.").
85. See supra note 84.
86. 199 N.J. Super. at 568, 489 A.2d at 1270.
87. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
89. This determination is critical in deciding whether an insurer has a duty to in-
demnify a policyholder because the court must make factual determinations concerning
when this damage occurred. No court has specifically determined if an insurer has a
duty to indemnify a CGL policyholder for liability arising from a CERCLA suit. The
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Courts in CERCLA insurance coverage litigation often analogize to
asbestos and DES case law to determine what factors trigger CGL cov-
erage.90 In asbestos and DES cases, courts rely on three different theo-
ries to determine policy coverage.91 The "exposure theory" states that
all insurers providing coverage from the injured party's initial exposure
to the manifestation of the damage are jointly and severally bound to
defend and indemnify the insured.92 The "manifestation theory" states
that liability extends only to insurance companies providing coverage
when the injuries either manifest themselves, or become reasonably as-
certainable by medical diagnosis.93 The "injury in fact" theory re-
courts await CERCLA liability determination before making factual determinations.
See, e.g., Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1182 (D. Md. 1985)
("[w]hether there is indeed liability for coverage must await the outcome of the [CER-
CLA] action").
90. See Joest, Will Insurance Companies Clean the Augean Stables?-Insurance
Coverage for the Landfill Operator, 50 INs. COUNS. J. 258, 261 (1983) (applies common
law developed in asbestos litigation to landfill litigation); Note, The Applicability of Gen-
eral Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1984)
(good review of asbestos case law used in determining the time of "occurrence" for
hazardous waste disposal cases).
91. See generally Stroch, Coming to Terms with the Compensation Conundrum, 71
A.B.A. J. 68 (Sept. 1985) (finds traditional tort law approach ineffective to compensate
hazardous waste victims); Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of Claims Liability for Certain
Illnesses with Long Latency Period Before Manifestation, 16 FORUM 636 (1981) (dis-
cusses various theories of "occurrence" used in asbestos and DES litigation); Note, Ad-
judicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 739, 758 (1984) (favors continuous injury exposure theory to determine insurer's
liability for resulting illnesses).
92. See Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 991-94
(5th Cir. 1985) (court held that all insurers providing coverage at the time of initial
silica inhalation liable for all resultant damages); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1524 (D.D.C. 1984) (insurer had a duty to indemnify the
manufacturer for asbestos-related claims if the policy was in effect at any time between
the claimant's initial exposure to asbestos and manifestation of the injury); Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1043-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (insurance
coverage triggered by exposure to asbestos dust and by the subsequent development of
disease), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218-19 (6th cir. 1980) (injury from asbestos first
occurs after initial inhalation of asbestos fibers), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
93. Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1982)
(policy coverage triggered in employment discrimination suit when the injurious effects
of the occurrence took place); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F.
Supp. 110, 115-18 (D. Mass. 1981), modified, 682 F.2d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1982) (asbes-
tos-related lung damage does not cause "injury" until it accumulates to become clini-
cally evident or manifest), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1, 345 N.E.2d 267 (1976) (insurer,
during whose period of coverage damage was first discovered, held liable for all loss or
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quires the policyholder to prove that an injury in fact occurred during
the policy period in order to receive coverage. 94
Few court decisions determine which coverage theory applies in
CERCLA cases. In Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical and Chemical Co.95 the court stated in dictum that it fa-
vored applying the injury in fact theory in CERCLA cases.9 6 The
court in Township of Jackson v. American Home Assurance Co.,97 how-
ever, said that the exposure theory is more suitable for ground water
contamination than the manifestation theory.9 8 The court held that a
subclinical injury during the policy period is necessary to trigger
coverage.
99
Asbestos exposure and hazardous waste exposure are similar in that
an occurrence can cause continuous, degenerative damage, and the ini-
tial damage takes place substantially before manifestation of the ulti-
mate injury."° While asbestos litigation focuses on bodily injury,
courts can apply the basic litigation principles to property damage in
CERCLA cases.' The similarities between asbestos and CERCLA
litigation arguably support the application of the exposure theory in
CERCLA cases to determine the scope of an insurer's liability. °2
damage to structure occurring thereafter even though the loss or damage extended be-
yond insurer's period of coverage).
94. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
95. No. 84-5034-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
96. Id. Litigation concerning the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify resulted in
CERCLA liability suit. The court stated that the insured could not have an "occur-
rence" for insurance policy purposes until the government filed a CERCLA liability suit
seeking recovery for cleanup costs. Id. The court, however, held that the issue was not
ripe for adjudication until more specific findings on bodily injury and property damage
were made. Id.
97. No. L-29236-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1984).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Stroch, supra note 91, at 71-72.
101. Joest, supra note 90, at 261.
102. Courts deciding CERCLA insurance suits usually apply an exposure theory in
determining if leakage from a hazardous waste site is an occurrence within the policy.
The courts have not addressed the question of whether an injury in fact has to be proven
within the policy period in order to trigger an insurer's duty to indemnify the policy-
holder. See, e.g., Mraz, 616 F. Supp. at 1179 (sufficient that the damage alleged oc-
curred during the policy period even though actual damage was not discovered until
approximately 10 years after the dumping); CPS, 199 N.J. Super. at 566, 589 A.2d at
1269 ("[t]ime of discovery of the accident does not determine when it took place");
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The exposure theory approaches CERCLA problems from the poli-
cyholder's perspective to determine whether the policyholder reason-
ably expected its CGL to cover the particular "occurrence." 10' 3 The
CGL exposure theory provides the policyholder the most comprehen-
sive coverage for damages,'" and enlarges the "pool" from which the
government may obtain reimbursement for response costs and other
damages available under CERCLA.1 °5 Enlarging the recovery pool
under the exposure theory also furthers an important public policy of
providing a fast and efficient cleanup method for abandoned hazardous
waste sites that are damaging or threatening to damage the
environment.
The insurance industry recently proposed an amendment to CER-
CLA that would limit generators' and transporters' liability for haz-
ardous waste leakeage from "approved" sites. 116 Under the proposal
an insurer's liability to a hazardous waste generator or transporter ends
when the waste is delivered to an approved disposal facility.1" 7 The
disposal facility owners are liable for any leakage occurring at the
site. 108
The insurance industry claims that the proposed amendment en-
courages private insurers to provide greater coverage for chemical
waste generators and transporters.10 9 The proposal advocates insuring
disposal site owners and operators under a joint government-private
insurance program.11o This joint program would be similar to current
insurance policies covering floods, nuclear accidents, and damages due
to rioting.'
Buckeye, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1233 (releases and threatened releases
of hazardous waste materials are "occurrences" within the policy provisions).
103. See supra note 92.
104. The exposure theory holds all insurance carriers at risk to defend and indem-
nify the insured from the injured party's initial exposure to the manifestation of the
damage. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
105. See id. at 1045-46. The Keene court found that if it used the manifestation
theory, the insured would not be covered for most asbestos-related claims because insur-
ance companies had ceased issuing policies that adequately covered asbestos-related dis-
eases. Id.
106. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 34-35.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. See also M. WOODROOF, J. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE
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Congress should reject the insurers' proposed CERCLA amend-
ment. The proposal effectively renders the American public, rather
than hazardous waste generators, liable for most damage resulting
from hazardous waste disposal. Furthermore, absolving hazardous
waste generators from liability for waste disposal inevitably entails gov-
ernment subsidization of the hazardous chemical industry.
Subsidizing the chemical industry, in turn, distorts the economic
market's reaction to the social costs imposed by hazardous wastes. If
waste generators are held responsible for disposal of their products,
they will charge a price that includes disposal costs. This forces the
hazardous chemical purchaser to balance a chemical's advantages
against its true cost. If the costs outweigh the chemical's benefits, the
purchaser will buy a different product. Consequently, chemical produ-
cers will only manufacture chemicals whose selling prices, including
the cost of insuring against future CERCLA suits, are acceptable in the
marketplace. Thus, rejecting the proposed CERCLA amendments will
indirectly limit hazardous chemical production to chemicals that can
be manufactured efficiently and disposed of safely.
In enacting CERCLA, Congress made a critical public policy deci-
sion. Congress explicitly enacted CERCLA to promote fast and effi-
cient cleanup of hazardous waste sites that pose an imminent threat to
our natural resources. The continued application of the strict joint and
several liability standard to hazardous waste generators, transporters,
and disposers promotes this overriding public policy. This liability
scheme also properly shifts the fiscal burden for safe waste disposal
from the general public to the party responsible for generating the haz-
ardous waste. In doing so, CERCLA-and the strict joint and several
liability standard-provides for equitable distribution of the cost of
hazardous waste disposal.
Joan Wart Gillespie
INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAW § 1:66 (1974) (discussion of auto insurance problems
for high risk individuals and the "pool" solution).
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